Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

US Strategy in the Middle East

If there was one theme around which our discussion revolved, it was the question of strategic coherence. The discussion organizers set out to determine whether it was problematic to lack policy uniformity toward the three geographically contiguous states of Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. We asked if it was appropriate to criticize Iran for fraudulent elections while sending tens of thousands of troops to bolster the Karzai regime even after it had its own electoral corruption.

Far from reaching an answer on that question, we did not reach consensus on whether the US had maintained coherence within our policies toward each country individually. To be clear, incoherence is used here in the sense that different elements fail to hang together well – not that they are unintelligible. Indeed, the various factors are well-known, if not fully understood or predictable. Rather, incoherence is similar to inconsistency – whether chronological or simply logical. The discussion addressed incoherence on three counts. First, some questioned whether our policy regarding Iran has remained consistent across time. Second, we could not come to a consensus regarding which state, either Pakistan or Afghanistan, was the real engine of instability. Third, the US, so far as we could surmise, has neither a comprehensive strategic planning process outside the Defense Department, nor a genuine regional strategy for the Middle East, nor a clear articulation of our critical interests. The consequence of this incoherence, and of our policy package in the region, is that we are increasingly perceived to lack the competence to achieve our stated goals.

With respect to Iran, we have exhibited (as some argued) inter-temporal inconsistency in two ways. First, we have in the past accepted their assistance in the war on terror and other efforts in the region (e.g., with Syria), promising subsequent reciprocation that ultimately was not forthcoming. Indeed, our express position with respect to Iran remains one of extreme hostility and rejection of the ruling regime’s legitimacy. Some still advocate an incremental approach to building better relations with Iran – though others forcefully argue that only comprehensive rapprochement (along the lines of Nixon’s normalization of relations with China) would yield significant progress. The second way in which our position vis a vis Iran remains incoherent is their perception of our shifting missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this respect, their refusal to continue cooperation with our demands is not only a product of our failure to reciprocate in the past, but because their past cooperation stemmed from an alignment of interests between us and them that they feel no longer exists.

When it comes to the Afghanistan/Pakistan nexus, the room was divided between those who believe that Afghanistan poses a threat to Pakistan’s stability and those who see the causal arrow working in the opposite direction, with the Pakistani regime destabilizing Afghanistan, either purposefully or as a byproduct of their support for the Taliban. Resolving this issue remains critical, because enumerating our interests in the region depends upon it. Pakistan’s nuclear capability makes the survival of the state security apparatus essential to preventing the possible acquisition of WMD by terrorist groups or other rogue actors. If Pakistan’s stability relies on stability in Afghanistan, then the US has a critical objective there. If, however, Pakistan is the engine of instability, then US withdrawal from Afghanistan imposes few broader consequences.

Finally, we come to the issue of long-term comprehensive strategic planning, and the consequences of its absence outside the Defense Department. CPOST’s recommendation to move toward offshore balancing depends upon diplomatic and economic levers to maintain influence in the region. Without comprehensive planning in these domains, offshore balancing will likely fail to secure any substantial benefit. The room seems to have agreed on the need to devise and execute a genuinely regional strategy with respect to both Afghanistan and Iran, involving all pertinent players and issues. However, without coherence on the issues discussed above and without a comprehensive strategic planning process, this prospect seems unlikely. Our reputation for competence has suffered greatly under these circumstances, and this has empowered less moderate factions in Middle Eastern states to assume greater influence domestically by virtue of their opposition to cooperating with US initiatives. Moreover, several participants noted the absence of much discussion on the issues of oil and the Israel/Palestine conflict. Are we so wrapped up in the operational-strategic issues that we have completely lost sight of the big picture, the fundamental purpose of our involvement in the Middle East?

The coverage of the foiled plot is still a bit confused, it seems. We have Janet Napolitano saying “[i]t has all the hallmarks of Al Qaeda.” Having studied AQ a bit, I’m not entirely sure what counts as one of their hallmarks, aside from being targeted at the U.S. So far as I know, they haven’t done much mail-bombing and they haven’t often chosen religiously-affiliated targets. Maybe she’s talking about unreleased evidence, and I’m not questioning the conclusion itself. I just don’t what hallmarks she’s talking about, and none of the commentary I’ve read offers any illumination on the matter.

Even less illuminating is Jeffrey Goldberg’s non-surprisingly ill-reasoned conclusion that this proves AQ has no policy motivation for its behavior, but is animated only by the joy of killing Jews. I just spent an hour yesterday reminding my students that facts don’t always speak for themselves, and Goldberg would do well to remind himself of this because he provides no explanation for why this attempted bombing supports his conclusion. Yes, AQ has repeatedly declared itself an enemy of the Jewish people — but they also admit no distinction between Israel and said population. Yes, AQ kills people with bombs and other weapons. Yes, they view the US as their enemy as well. We already knew all these things, and none of the facts in this case speaks particularly to the question of their motivations. I have no idea whatsoever how this would show, as Goldberg asserts, that AQ doesn’t care about West Bank settlements. Seriously, I just don’t see it.

Update: this doesn’t clear things up very much. The complexity of the devices is supposed to indicate both a) that it’s Al Qaeda and b) that AQ has improved its bomb-making techniques. That’s not logically impossible, but it’s not the simplest explanation. If the bomb has superior technical design and construction compared to previous AQ attempts, that would more likely indicate a different bomb-maker, wouldn’t it? Given that it originated in Yemen, and possibly on the strength of undisclosed evidence, it seems likely that AQ is behind the attempt. But the improved construction of the devices seems to be doing too much work in this article.

This is especially important when discussing matters of security and terrorism. The US public is famously under-informed on international issues. This makes the role of the journalist as information provider/processor that much more critical on these issues.

First, she critiques our causal argument that suicide terrorism is triggered by foreign military occupation by a democratic state. The crux of her point is that, like Willy Sutton’s explanation for his habit of robbing banks (“that’s where the money is”), terrorism has increased in Iraq and Afghanistan simply because the targets of these attacks (namely US personnel) have become more accessible. There is indeed some truth to her response, but only some. On the one hand, the increase in targets in a particular location explains the geographic distribution of attacks, but not the massive increase in the number of attacks. For Schake’s response to hold, she would have to show that US targets were prohibitively difficult to locate or sufficiently secure against suicide attack prior to the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq. You would have to believe that there are thousands of would-be terrorists in places like Indonesia and Morocco who would commit suicide attacks if only there were US targets in their neighborhood. On the other hand, we argue that the deployment of Coalition forces to the region increases the level of fear and perceived grievance among local populations, motivating more people to become suicide bombers and thereby increasing the volume of attacks. To be sure, troops in-country are a focal-point for terrorists and constitute an obvious choice of target for those who are already motivated to commit attacks, but motivation is a critical precursor to target selection. So in both her and our arguments, the location of troop deployment explains some aspect of the pattern of suicide terrorism. However, we feel secure in our argument since her logic only explains target selection, while ours explains both target selection and the increase in attack frequency and number.

Second, she argues that our proposed strategic change (moving away from occupation and toward offshore balancing, replacing military deployment with diplomatic and economic efforts while keeping naval forces just over the horizon) sacrifices important political goals in the region. In her talk, she did not specify what these political values are, but we can, for the sake of argument, assume these goals exist (whether they’re important enough to justify the costs is another argument altogether). The surrender of these values, she argues, would be the predictable result of our proposed strategy because military forces are superior to diplomatic and economic means for achieving these goals. I find this a disputable claim, but can (again for the sake of argument) assume she is correct and still find two problems with her argument. First, she must show not only that military means are superior to others, but that such means are sufficient to the task. If neither method is sufficient, it matters not a whit which is superior. Second, even if military means are sufficient, she must also demonstrate either that other means are insufficient or that the superiority of the military tool is not swamped by the additional costs its use incurs.

In her presentation at the conference, she implied to some degree many of the points I’ve claimed she must make, so I expect that she would feel up to the challenge I’ve laid before her. To summarize, I argue that she must do three things: 1) explain how the dramatic increase in attacks (not just their geographic distribution) under occupation is due primarily to increased target availability and not increased local grievance, 2) show that military means are sufficient to achieve our political goals, and 3) show either that other means are insufficient or that the superiority of the military tool overcomes its attendant additional cost.

UPDATE: Schake has a post at Foreign Policy presenting her critique, and it’s very similar to what she said at the conference. However, there are a few points that I must have missed.

Except for the “improved” political and economic activity. How that will be undertaken in a deteriorating security environment is mysterious. Moreover, if we could do any better at the provision of political and economic engagement, we’d already be doing that.

She assumes that the security environment would be deteriorating, but that’s far from certain, especially since (as we argue) the removal of occupation forces would actually improve an important aspect of the security environment (ie, the suicide bombing campaign). Second, she presumes that our current strategy for political and economic engagement is indeed optimal. Would she have said the same thing about the military strategy we had prior to the “surge?” Strategies aren’t fixed, but can always be improved if they’re made a priority. Furthermore, our economic and political efforts are not working in a vacuum, but rather are operating in a context where the military instrument is in full swing — a situation that is bound to complicate diplomatic efforts and inhibit economic development.