While Al Qaeda and AQAP are similar threats within similar areas, rugged terrain with little to no state control, the United States has followed two very different policies in these areas. In Afghanistan, the United States has occupied and attempted to control through force. At the same time, in Yemen, facing an equally well developed enemy, the United States has avoided putting boots on the ground, choosing instead to operate in a more off-shore fashion. Indeed, observers not affiliated with this organization have noted that this is something of a natural experiment comparing counter-insurgency with an Off-shore Balancing strategy.

With the death of Awlaqi following closely on the heels of the death of Osama bin Laden, it is increasingly apparent that troops within hostile areas which have no intrinsic value merely to ward off terror threats is a wasteful effort. Neither bin Laden nor Awlaqi were particularly successful in attacking the United States after September 11th, and have in fact failed to carry out a single successful terrorist attack on the American homeland in that time. At the same time, bin Laden, Awlaqi, and their proxies are very successful within their respective ‘backyards’, killing thousands of Americans and locals in multiple attacks.

Over the past few years, many advocates of counterinsurgency have doubted Off-Shore Balancing specifically arguing that only large ground forces on-shore could create the conditions for significant intelligence on terrorist operatives. As we saw in the death of OBL in the center of Pakistan and now in Alwaki in Yemen, COIN advocates have missed the boat — most likely because they have confused the ability of soldiers on the ground to collect tactical intelligence about low-level fighters immediately in front of them (which their presence sometimes stimulates) with strategic intelligence about the location of mid and senior level operatives and leaders.

Neither Awlaqi nor bin Laden were within areas with heavy American presence, and yet we were able to kill both of them. It therefore stands to reason that the United States suffers no degraded capability in killing its adversaries absent large ground troop presence, but that terrorist enemies lack the capability to attack Americans unless we are within there immediate area. Therefore, while the War against Terror has been costly in blood and treasure we can now say with some great certainty that a reduction in troop presence will not decrease the American ability to prosecute such war, but it will decrease al Qaeda’s ability to inflict costs on the United States.

As the United States enters negotiations with regards to the budget and its need to reduce its expense burden, it behooves law and policy makers to bear this lesson in mind. While it might make rational sense to incur costs abroad, in the form of war, to prevent costs at home, in the form of terror attacks, it is apparent we do not live in a world where those are necessary risks. At least with respect to the main terrorist threat we face, the United States is completely capable of protecting itself, and proactively defending itself by eliminating its adversaries, even without a large ground force in hostile countries. The United States can therefore probably greatly reduce its debt burden, and potentially even increase its security, by reducing its overseas involvement.

We have talked about the importance of strategy in reference to the budget before. Nothing has changed in the short intervening period to alter our position. It behooves the Secretary of Defense to take the lead on ensuring that a national Grand Strategy which is compatible with budgetary constraints is clearly articulated. Indeed, a clearly articulated strategy is important to many groups which the United States should care about: the domestic public, the American Defense industry, and American allies and fellow travelers.

The American public not only has a right to know what exactly the government intends to do to secure the nation, but also has an important role to play in that decision. Americans generally, but especially within the Academic and think tank community serve as a check on ideas proposed by the government. When the national Grand Strategy is proposed and articulated publicly these people, and the constituents will be able to understand better what exactly it is the government is doing internationally. Additionally, the American taxpayer will be paying for the Grand Strategy, and one of the fundamental tenets of democracy is that the people have input into the way that their government spends their money. A well articulated and though out Grand Strategy will show to the American people that their money will be well spent, and that they will have a maximum of security with a minimum of waste.

One of the greatest strengths of the United States has long been the ability to harness industry without choking it. This partnership relies upon open flows of information between the government and industry. While it seems probable that the defense industry will oppose any cuts to the Department of Defense which will affect they bottom line, insofar as those cuts occur within a well defined nation Grand Strategy the industry will be better able to predict what needs will arise in the future, adapt to changes at the earliest possible time, and minimize losses to themselves and to their shareholders. At a time of financial and economic instability it is important to minimize needless shocks, and a well articulated Grand Strategy will go a long way to achieving that goal. Furthermore, if the United States wishes to maintain the technological superiority on the battlefield which it has enjoyed for more than half a century, then it must help those organizations which have given it that superiority to predict what that battlefield will look like, so they can anticipate technological needs.

Finally, the United States has been an important player on the international stage and will doubtless continue to be so in the future, however, with a new Grand Strategy the nature of that role will change. It is possible that countries that have relied nearly exclusively on the United States for their security will need to make adjustments to continue to be able to secure their interests. Additionally, it will allow those countries to give input to the United States in the role that such a change will play in their security, and the impact that the change in their security situation will have on American security. The absolute worst case outcome would be to have a state not realize that it cannot count on immediate American assistance, and fail to adjust accordingly, thereby losing its international freedom of action.

While Secretary Panetta is an experienced bureaucrat and political player, he may not realize the significance of strategic planning at the military level. We hope he takes the opportunity which has been presented to him to safely, smartly, and carefully America’s defense posture to a position which is more beneficial to American interests. In this effort it would be good to council with those in and out of the Department of Defense which have a deep understanding of the issues the United States faces. By so doing, Secretary Panetta can present and defend a plan which is feasible in economic, political, and security terms.

Panetta confers credibility on the Defense budget trigger because of his history and reputation as an able budget manager.  As a former chairman of the House Committee on the Budget, and Director of the Office of Management and Budget as well as Chief of Staff to President Clinton, he has a record as a financial fixer – he is often credited as a central actor responsible for the budgetary achievements of the late 1990s.  This reputation was cited as President Obama’s justification for nominating him to direct the Central Intelligence Agency despite never having served in the intelligence community.  Although reliable evidence is difficult to obtain (CIA budgets are classified), it seems as though Panetta has help stabilize the agency’s budget after a near doubling between 2001 and 2009 – without sacrificing core mission capabilities (such as eliminated Osama bin Laden).

In addition to his skills at budget management, he has a sterling reputation as a legislative negotiator, and the fiscal health of the U.S. desperately needs a true triumph of negotiation.  As an 8-term congressman (most of which time he spent on the budget committee), he knows the politics and procedures of the legislative budget process as well as anyone who has served as Defense Secretary.  As such, he is uniquely qualified to participate in the coming budget battles as an advisor, to put the stakes of the debate in context, and even to offer solutions short of letting the process fail – in other words, he can clarify the consequences of the trigger in terms that the special committee members can comprehend.

To be sure, Panetta has thus far shown little in the way of a “can-do” attitude toward further substantial defense budget reductions.  He has flatly rejected the idea of allowing the trigger to be pulled, saying the additional cuts would “do real damage to our security.”  However, he has been careful to specify that his rejection is brought against “across the board” cuts.  Crude, non-targeted reductions are the bane of any serious policy-maker, and Panetta is nothing if not serious.   Furthermore, he has already agreed that the initial $400 billion in reductions are “manageable.”

Despite the recent, embarrassing struggle over the debt limit, the prospect for enacting sensible defense spending reductions is made more promising by the current Secretary of Defense.  Still, this leaves other critical questions unanswered.  In particularly, we still worry that this process will lead to a consideration of reductions to the defense budget prior to a rethinking of the grand strategy it supports (putting the cart before the horse).  In any case, if substantial spending cuts are forced upon the Pentagon, Panetta will get the chance to prove his reputation.

We choose the word recasting carefully; we are not suggesting that American nationalism should be fundamentally altered. Instead, what we are proposing is that we return to the American Identity which was dominant from the end of the civil rights movement through September 11th, namely that all who choose to live as Americans, and respect freedom can be Americans. This identity has a great deal of resonance with most Americans, and has the further virtue of having a long pedigree within American thought, meaning that a complete rethinking of American identity is unnecessary. The sources of such nationalism is well documented in Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism.

There are four areas of society which we believe are essential in order for this recasting to succeed: religious and cultural leadership, the entertainment industry, higher education, and political leadership, especially from President Obama. We do not mean to suggest that any of these four groups has been responsible for this problem. Further, we do not mean to suggest that there are not other areas where improvement is possible. We merely feel that these three areas of cooperation are necessary for success on the larger scale.

We wish to stress up front, that none of these suggestions should be taken to mean that any religious or cultural group should abandon their core values, whether Muslim or otherwise. A fundamental tenet of American Identity is that you are free to be who you will be, and to abandon that idea would surely be bad for any integration efforts. We also recognize that there is tension between this core value and some of what we are about to suggest, but we believe that deep thought, and hard work can find a suitable middle ground.

There are two socio-cultural groups whose cooperate will help the recasting to succeed: Muslims and non-Muslims. The Muslim community would be best served by educating itself about the issues which are relevant to this discussion. On one hand, Muslims may be happy to discover that Muslims actually do quite well in the United States, and are generally treated well. On the other hand, Muslims will be better equipped if they truly know the facts surrounding terrorism and its generally political origins. Understanding the foreign policies, domestic issues, and economic tribulations which create terrorism will go a long way towards being able to demonstrate that violence is not caused by issues stemming from religion. Indeed, we consider it part of our mission to provide this information to all interested people, including on this web page. Finally, Muslims will help increase their perceptions as American when they consistently refer to themselves as such, and emphasize it at every opportunity.

Non-Muslim religious and cultural leaders have a role to play as well. Obviously, non-Muslims and Muslims will disagree on important issues, whether it is the Prophethood of Muhammad, the Divinity of Jesus Christ, or the existence of a God at all. It would be unfair and inconsistent to expect people to stifle disagreement merely in the name of integration. However, at the same time, such leaders will better respect American Muslim’s by being fair and honest in their criticism. Insofar as Islam is a religious tradition far more than a religious organization, there are as many forms of adherence within Islam as there are within Christianity. Also, non-Muslim religious leaders ought to distinguish between religious practice and national policy. It would be fair for example, for a Christian preacher to criticize Islamic religion for its failure to recognize the Divinity of Christ, but would be unfair to criticize Muslims generally, or American Muslims specifically, for the laws of Saudi Arabia. Additionally, socio-cultural leaders should include Muslims appropriately in activities. While small in number, Muslim groups could no doubt help in service activities, or political activism when there is a shared interest.

For better or worse entertainment media drives a fair amount of public opinion, and serves as an outsize source of information for large numbers of people. For this reason entertainment is indispensable in casting the American Identity. Indeed, the entertainment industry has been attempting whole-heartedly to cast Muslims as non-terrorists, but their efforts have been ham-handed, and have actually made the problem worse. This is in large part due to the fact that rather than attempting to lift up the American Identity and include Muslims, it has instead attempted to tear down America and Americans for ‘excluding’ Muslims. Indeed, portrayals of Americans and Muslims (regardless of their background) often cast them on opposite sides of a conflict. The fact that the ‘American’ is usually shown to be a boorish bigot does nothing to change the fact that the ‘American’ and the ‘Muslim’ are not the same.

The entertainment industry would have more success by drawing on the example of the treatment of Asians and Japanese in entertainment following World War II. First, entertainment ought to recognize that there are conflicts between Americans and non-Americans, and to portray them honestly. Al Qaeda did attack the United States, and would like to continue to do so. Plot lines should acknowledge that, instead of presenting Muslims as a Red Herring. Indeed, the introduction of a Muslim culprit as a Red Herring, only to substitute out an American Corporation, Nazi’s, or a disgruntled Veteran only emphasizes that the normal reaction to terrorism should be to suspect the Muslim, and yet creates the perception that there is a conspiracy to hide it from the public. This would be like making a movie about World War Two, where it turns out that it was not the Japanese who bombed Pearl Harbor, but General Electric. Of course, there is no popular movie like that, and in fact there are a fair number of books, films and television programs that portray in very human and American terms, the toll the conflict had on Japanese-Americans, as they brought their Japanese ethnicity into harmony with their American Identity. Second, it would be good if entertainment portrayed the role that American Muslims, as Americans, have played, including in the War on Terror. Many interpreters, FBI agents, and informants have all risked their lives as Americans, to protect America from terrorist attack. Finally, the entertainment industry would do well to portray the American Identity as a characteristic worthy of respect. There is no nobility in integrating Muslims into the American Identity if the American Identity is not something worth having.

We are most intimately familiar with the role that higher education can play in reducing stereotypes. We feel that a battery of classes at many universities, which seriously addresses the topics of both nationalism, without demonizing it — as is often the case in higher education, and terrorism will go to great lengths to help decrease the sense that American Muslims are in fact a large source of domestic terrorism. Nationalism courses should examine the sources of American Nationalism, and the competing visions without inherently judging one vision over the other. Terrorism courses should honestly teach the varying theories about terrorism, including those which argue religious motivation. We feel confident that by addressing the facts carefully, students will be better equipped to answer fundamental questions. The version of American Identity which includes American Muslims is intrinsically more appealing to the majority of American students, and they do not need to be cajoled, tricked or indoctrinated to arrive at that conclusion on their own. We are also confident enough in our findings that we believe that when any course presents the facts of all arguments fairly, the relative merits of the strategic sources of terrorism will be apparent. Further, it is not necessary that all students accept the same interpretations, and those who do not agree will be the source of further refinement and future academic debate, which is the heart and soul of true study.

Finally, the government must take action, but most importantly the President. President Obama is a skilled orator with a ‘bully pulpit’. He must use that pulpit subtlely, to unify and create the American Identity. Great presidents in the past have done so. Ronald Reagan and John F. Kennedy helped to create the American Identity in the face of Communism, and the Russians. Franklin Roosevelt did the same in opposition to Communism. However, Andrew Jackson was instrumental in defining out Native Americans in a way that affected the country to this day. Ulysses S. Grant failed to take the opportunity to forge the American Identity to include the freed slaves. Without the President, this task becomes quite difficult.

The president will have the most success if he changes several things in order to succeed at this recasting. First, he would could help this recasting by abandoning universalism in his rhetoric. After all, if Americans are the same as Indians and Arabs, then it stands to reason that American Muslims would be the same as Indian Muslims and Arab Muslims, since the national prenomen drops out. Second, the President would acquire a strong tool if he embraced a certain form of American Exceptionalism: the idea that American Identity is not established by birth, but by loyalty. This American Exceptionalism not only allows but demands that loyal American Muslims must be treated the same as other Americans. Finally, the President would best be able to assuage fears in the Muslim and non-Muslim community by defending all Americans constitutional rights, in word and deed. At a most basic level, within the United States, the ‘conflict’ between Muslims and non-Muslims is a fear that they will not be accorded their constitutional rights. Muslims fear that they will be unfairly imprisoned, or shipped to Guantanamo without a fair trial. Non-Muslims fear that undue and aconstitutional deference to Islam will infringe on their constitutional rights. By publicly, vocally and visibly advocating for strong constitutional protections for all the President can overcome many people’s fears.

There are many who would prefer that this effort will fail. Of course, Al Qaeda and its co-conspirators would prefer to have a ready pool of American nationals ready for recruitment to their cause. Furthermore, there are undoubtedly bigots of all political stripes who would like to exclude Muslims for unrelated ideological or racial reasons. However, we are confident that most Americans prefer to have all Americans included in the American Identity, so that all Americans feel they have a vested interest in the strength and prosperity of the country. However, a renewal of the American Identity can surely overcome these challenges.

In our previous installments on one of the issues that have arisen in the wake of the Norwegian terror attacks we have discussed how Muslims have become branded with the image of terrorism. Having a single group that is associated with terrorism carries several costs: 1) it creates an Other within society that generally wishes not to be the Other. 2) It creates blind spots for intelligence and law enforcement which gives freedom to other violent groups to act. 3) It deprives the state of the resources of the group which has involuntarily assumed the role of the other. All of these costs would be better if they were avoided, but obviously so far we have failed at that task. However, we propose here a new reframing of the problem which can hopefully introduce a new discourse and mode of thinking.

The root of the issue is in American nationalism, but not in the way that many people think. Often nationalism is seen as a universal bad, in part because of its negative associations from the Twentieth Century, but in the case of the United States, a reforging of American nationalism could serve to overcome these costs. The United States has always seen itself as a unique nation, where one chose to be American rather than being born to it. This nationalism has not always held strong, such as during the internment of the Japanese during World War II. Nevertheless, it has allowed the U.S. to absorb and assimilate a wide variety of immigrants in a way that few other countries have. Indeed, the level of harmony in the United States is striking given the ethnic and religious diversity.

In the wake of September 11th, the American identity underwent a recasting, which did not help it. Prior to September 11th, America’s natural liberalism led Americans to believe that everyone in the world liked what they liked, and that they had nothing to fear from any free people. However, following September 11th Americans increasing came to believe that Muslims were trying to kill them. This was a direct result of authors across the political spectrum asserting that there was something about American that Muslims did not like. Unsurprisingly, whatever it was that made Muslims hate America, according to the authors, was also what the authors thought America should change, whether it is America’s ‘arrogance’ or unequal distribution of wealth or materialistic culture. A seminal piece in this vein was the article by Fareed Zakaria “Why Do They Hate Us.” This created a sense of the Other within Americans.

The introduction of the new Other happened at a very unfortunate time for America, when Americans felt at their most vulnerable, and kicked the American identity into flux. There was a concerted effort by many in culture and politics to ensure that American Muslims were not excluded, the feeling of the threat from the Muslim Other overwhelmed the old American identity, and for them it was recast in opposition to Islam. Websites that document violence by Muslims or attempts to introduce Sharia proliferated. Indeed, two very popular such websites Gates of Vienna and Jihad Watch consistently rank very high in the Technorati.com rankings, and were listed as influencing Anders Breivick. (It is worth noting that just like Muslims, these groups should not be vilified by association either. The rankings show that many, perhaps even millions of people, read these blogs, and only one is a mass murder.) Indeed, the Deobandi and Wahhabi schools of Islam are stark contrasts with American liberalism. It was therefore easy and natural, absent any other substantive threat, for many Americans to begin to view America, the bastion of liberalism, in opposition to an intolerant and oppressive Islamist menace.

The unfortunate side effect, however, is that few American Muslims subscribe to those tenets, and yet were swept out of the definition of American by this recasting. Indeed, one of the tenets of fundamentalist Islam is that true Muslims should not live in countries ruled by non-Muslims. While the most extreme Muslims feel that all countries qualify because even the Wahhabist House of Saud has strayed too far, the United States certainly does not qualify. While there are undoubtedly a few Muslims in the U.S. who might prefer to live elsewhere many were born here, and most of the rest chose to come here precisely because they want to be Americans. Whether it is our jobs and freedom, or our X-box’s and our beer, almost all American Muslims prefer America as it is to other countries. Were it no so they would have gone to those countries. If they had preferred to live in a reconstitution of 6th Century Arabia there is already one of those waiting their arrival in Yemen. Anwar al Awlaki has already gone there.

Implicit in this statement is the admission that there is indeed an Other, or a threat. To argue that there is no threat is to bury ones head in the sand. That threat, however, comes from outside the United States borders. Fortunately, that threat has also proven itself incapable, so far, of repeating attacks within the United States. Americans must be aware of the threat, and the must understand the nature of the threat which we have discussed elsewhere. It should come as no surprise, however, that the threat to the American Nation would not include people within the Nation.

The question then arises, “How can we change this situation?” The United States need to consciously establish a national identity which is inclusive of all who choose to be Americans, while acknowledging that there is indeed groups of people who are not American, do not share America’s goals, and sometimes wish America harm. We will discuss those methods in the future.

In the previous article we discussed how Islam has come to be associated, seemingly inextricably, with Muslims. We pointed out that this is not a delusion, but rather the result of actual real world occurrences. Furthermore, we talked about how many groups in the past have had similar associations with terrorism. Of course, if there is no cost to this association then there is no reason to care particularly about this issue.  Unfortunately for the United States, there are three kinds of associated costs with the universal perception that Muslims are linked to terrorism. We will focus in these pages on the United States, insofar as we are an American University, most of our associates are Americans, and the United States is the most powerful state within the system and therefore risks the most by ignoring costs. Furthermore, the issue of American Muslims is a much more tractable issue than Muslims in general. After all, it would be foolish to deny that there are many Muslims who dislike and are violent against U.S. interests, but sharing a religion no more links those Muslims, of questionable religious rectitude, to Muslims in the United States, anymore than shared religion linked the IRA to Mexican Catholics.

The first, and most obvious, cost is the cost born by American Muslims. It is difficult to understand or to express the degree to which being constantly associated with a violent group which attacks the U.S. affects Muslims in the United States. The great tragedy is that many American Muslims came to the United States specifically to avoid persecution by the very same people who currently attack the West, like the large U.S. Ahmadi Muslim community, or they are converts who believe in a version of Islam which is tempered by the American experience, and therefore not subject to the same temptations to extremism as perhaps a Saudi or Pakistani Muslim might be. It is possible that some will simply dismiss this disproportionate burden as being merely a cost of war, similar to the disproportionate burden that military families bear. However, this cost creates a situation where a population within the borders of the United States are forced to feel a sense of Otherness which they would not otherwise feel. In other words, the Islamist terrorists by creating a situation wherein Americans themselves are creating an Other which previously did not exist within its borders, and which does not wish to be there.

The second cost, often noted but bears repeating hear, is that by focusing on one group we as a society develop blind spots, which are just as dangerous as the threat of actual Islamist terrorism. Indeed, it is partially the single-minded focus on a single form of terrorism which could allow another group, whether right wing, insane lone wolf, or communist to pull off an attack which they would not usually be capable of if they were allotted the appropriate level of scrutiny.

The third cost is the cost which the state bears because of the new Others within its borders. Every state draws upon the abilities of its citizens for its strengths. In some cases, certain groups have disproportionate access to certain skills, Arabic language skills are more common in the Islamic community, for example. Furthermore, each group has unique knowledge of its own internal workings. When a group which ordinarily would participate in the state apparatus is suddenly forced out by a universal sense of otherness it deprecates the states capabilities. The state loses access to the information the community might have about any interlopers therein, and the community becomes unwilling to give aid to the state in ways that the state could need. In the case of the U.S. and Muslims, the U.S. certainly could use the help of the many Muslim Arabic language speakers, not to mention the internal intelligence that domestic community ties have on everything from welfare to terrorism, and the natural ties that immigrant communities have to home for intelligence collection just to name a few.

One of the most important things to remember is that while the U.S. might have a large number of Muslim enemies, Muslims are not all one group, and American Muslims are not the enemy. The only successful terrorist attack in the United States against Americans in the last fifteen years was September 11th, and not one of those men was American. Every other attack plotted in the U.S. has been interdicted, often well before the execution phase, and usually with the help of American Muslims, relatives and friends, who tip off the authorities. The one possible exception to this rule, Ft. Hood (if MAJ Hassan is not ruled insane), is illustrative in that MAJ Hassan was not within the Muslim community but the U.S. Army, and the non-Muslim authorities he worked with failed to stop him. All of the American Muslim terrorists, Adam Gadahn, Omar Shafik Hammami, Richard Reid, and Anwar al-Awlaki have actually been forced to leave the country to carry on the fight. To be sure, all of these men have expressed a hatred of the United States and the West, and surely if the U.S. was their target they would be much more successful locally. It is not that the U.S. is prohibitive to terrorism, as in 2010 (the last year that data is available) the Global Terrorism Database records that there were ten successful terrorist attacks in the U.S., although with thankfully few casualties. The bottom line is that Americans, Muslim and otherwise, prefer no terrorism to terrorism, and have worked to make that happen.

Insofar as this schism exists, we should work to find a solution. We will discuss that solution further in the next installment in this series.

As more information has become available regarding the tragedy that so recently befell Norway, it behooves us to consider more carefully some of the lessons that we can learn from this incident. Stephen Walt recently pointed to one lesson that he believes is important, saying:

As soon as the shocking and tragic news from Norway hit the airwaves, it was entirely predictable that various right-wing Islamophobes [sic] would type first and think later. They were so eager to exploit the tragedy to peddle their pre-existing policy preferences that they blindly assumed the acts had to have been perpetrated by al Qaeda, by its various clones, or by some other radical Muslim group.

Dr. Walt is onto something here, but he only points out half of the problem. It is true that those who vehemently oppose the expansion of Islamic influence initially attributed the Oslo attacks to Muslims and they turned out to be wrong. However, the fact is that it was not just right-leaning writers who initially believed that to be the case. Indeed, everyone seemed to initially conclude that an Islamic group was responsible. One of the earliest publications to attribute the attacks to an Islamist group was the New York Times (their link has since been taken down), hardly a bastion of anti-Islamic sentiment. Indeed, Glenn Greenwald of Salon.com, whom Dr. Walt quotes in a follow up blog, instantly took to his blog to argue that one could hardly blame Islamist groups for resorting to violence, given the litany of abuses they have received at the hands of the West.

In moderate defense of all of these writers, it is not as though there was absolutely no indication that this might have been an Islamist attack. Dr. Walt and others correctly point out that Islamist based terrorism in Europe is a minuscule fraction of all terrorist attacks in Europe. However, a simple search of the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database reveals that of the nine massive casualty attacks in Europe in the last ten years, all but one of them was carried out by an Islamist group. Even the one non-Islamist massive casualty event was by the IRA, in March 2001, and resulted in only one death. Furthermore, the other massive casualty attacks occurred as part of a coordinated attack on multiple locations, just as the attacks in Norway did, meaning that the modus operandi of the Oslo attacks matched those of Al Qaeda, and Al Qaeda affiliated groups. Finally, very shortly after the attack an Islamist group claimed responsibility for the terrorist attacks, with a statement that seemed boilerplate grievance of Islamist groups, and well within the time frame for a legitimate claim.

All of those issues notwithstanding, the point remains that no one, left or right gave any indication that they believed that anyone other than an Islamist group might be responsible for the Norway attacks. This is indicative of a much broader phenomenon, which bypasses ideology and interests. Indeed, it seems that throughout the world, and across ideologies, large scale terrorist attacks are inextricably linked in the public’s mind to Islam, and Muslims. Even those who attempt to defend Islam and Muslims from stereotyping as terrorists, do so on the general assumption that Muslims are terrorist, but that they are terrorists for non-Muslim reasons. In simple terms, Muslims are currently carrying the ‘Terrorism ball’.

The ‘Terrorism ball’, or the perception that one group is disproportionately responsible for terrorism, is not a new phenomenon, and it has been passed from group to group over time. It is not necessarily the same all over the world. In the late 1800′s through the early Twentieth Century, terrorism was closely associated with Anarchists, especially those from Eastern Europe. In the interwar period, Communist sympathizers and members of the far right began to carry the terrorism ball. Nationalist groups, and leftist student movements began to be seen as the primary purveyors of terrorism in the post-War years. Indeed, even Middle Eastern groups that were terroristic like, the Palestinian Liberation Organization or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine were steeped in Marxist ideology. During this time, the IRA rose to prominence in Great Britain. Finally, in the 1980′s Muslims picked up the terrorism ball, and no one, so far, has displaced them. What this means is that over time, if there had been a terrorist attack in the past there was almost always a group which was more likely to be suspected, regardless of whether or not they were responsible.

It is worth pointing out that in each of these cases the perception of the terrorism ball was not a delusion. There really were Anarchist terrorists, who often were Eastern European. Communists and Fascists, student revolutionary groups, nationalists and the IRA, were real, and carried out terrorist attacks. It is undeniably true that there are Islamist terrorists, and some terrorists are Muslim. In some ways, these groups all started carrying the terrorism ball, because some people in their group willingly assumed that role. However, leaving aside the Communists and Fascists of the interwar period because of the confusion introduced by World War II, the overwhelming majority of those groups were not participating in violence. One can only imagine the horror that would have been the 1960′s and 70′s, as if they were not already bad enough, had the majority of students in the U.S., or even the majority of leftist students been violent. The same is true of Muslims, and especially true of Muslims in the United States.

This may seem to be of trivial interest, but there are significant costs to this phenomenon. In the next portion of this series we will discuss the costs imposed by the perception that a single group is closely associated with terrorism.

Following the conclusion of the Cold War many observers felt that the United States and Russia would finally be able to overcome their differences and change from competitors into partners. However, as the Russian economy collapsed in the 1990’s and with the cession of power by Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin and a hawkish Bush Administration, relations have significantly cooled. While it is the case that the United States and Russia are no longer adversaries, it is difficult to see them as partners. This relationship remains important because Russia and the U.S. still maintain the largest nuclear arsenals in the world, and Russia continues to have a significant presence in both Europe and Asia. The United States, for its part, has made conciliatory gestures towards Russia, such as the unilateral abandonment of the ballistic missile defense system based in Eastern Europe, and the ill-fated Clinton ‘reset button’ diplomatic mission. As this relationship continues to develop, President Obama has appointed a new Ambassador to Russia, who is not a typical diplomat. We are optimistic that if the Senate confirms him, Michael McFaul may be able help change the Russian-American relationship from tense to productive.

Michael McFaul is not a product of campaign fundraising or of the diplomatic corps, as are many ambassadors, but instead is a highly trained academic. Of course, we recognize that not all academics are well suited to the statesman role, in part because the administrative skills required to lead an embassy are not necessary learned as a scholar. Nevertheless, it appears that Dr. McFaul may indeed be that rare combination of expert and administrator.

Dr. McFaul has a broad background with a wide ranging number of associations . Academically he has worked with the Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) both as pre-doctoral and post-doctoral fellow as well as at Moscow State University and Stanford, where he currently is a member of the faculty. Furthermore, he has worked as a Foreign Policy advisor for Pres. Obama since his campaign, while at the same time working with the conservative-leaning Hoover Institute, as well as the Freedom House. The sheer number of Dr. McFaul’s publications is staggering for any scholar and stunningly so for one so regularly engaged with the political process.

It might seem that as academics we are merely being taken in by one of our own, but that is not the case. While in some cases it is advisable to have a political appointee in a position of power, such is rarely the case when political relationships are unclear and divisive. In those cases, a regional and political expert may be a much better choice, such as Zalmay Khalilzad (a University of Chicago Alumnus). Dr. McFaul has shown that he is well versed in the issues that Russia faces, and is knowledgeable about the challenges of the international system. Furthermore, Dr. McFaul’s background working with wide ranging groups of all ideological stripes shows that he is probably not an ideologue, dedicated to a single interpretation of the world system. While such dedication is a good way to make a career as an academic, it may not be advantageous as a bureaucrat.

Ultimately, the American-Russian relationship is still evolving. At times, Russia appears prepared to accept the status of a non-great power. Nevertheless, it was only three years ago that Russia and Georgia fought a destructive war. Furthermore, Russia continues to seemingly pursue traditional balancing strategies, such as the establishment of a customs union which will compete with the E.U., and the Shanghai Cooperative Organization, which seems to counter-balance the strength of N.A.T.O. Hopefully, someone who has thought long and hard on the issues facing these two nations can help them to arrive at a destination which is beneficial to both sides.

Yesterday evening, in Mumbai, three bombs exploded killing at least 18 people and wounding dozens more. There has been little intelligence forthcoming about the groups involved, and much of the initial information that has come out of the Home Office has focused on the fact that this does not appear to be a failure of intelligence. Most analysis naturally focuses on the role that the explosions play in the international arena, specifically with relationship Pakistan.

Ever since the Mumbai attacks of 2008, India has kept a very watchful eye on terrorist organizations and terrorism has been a hot topic for the Indians as well as the Pakistanis who rightly fear that a Pakistani association with a terrorist organization would chain gain the Pakistanis into a nuclear war with India. As is often the case, nuclear weapons have a way of focusing people’s attention.

However, here CPOST, we have focused a great deal on terrorists as independent actors. While it may be the case that terrorists are state sponsored, they are not universally so. Even in the cases where states sponsor terrorist organizations, states often find themselves in a version of the principal-agent problem. While it might seem like states can gain some freedom of action by acting through terrorist proxies, the danger is very high, because one can never be certain what the terrorist organizations may do nor the reaction that the target state might take. It therefore behooves all players to understand what motivates terrorists to attacks, and to act accordingly.

It is for this reason that it is very difficult to project what will happen in the fallout from the terrorist attack in Mumbai last night. The question that we really need to know the answer to we do not: Why did last nights attackers attack? Put another way, what did the attackers hope to accomplish by attacking Mumbai last night.

Of course, who the actors are play a significant role, but not nearly so significant as the declared and perceived motivations of the attacker. For example, it is quite possible that the terrorists are actually Indian nationals, who are Muslims, and have an issue with the way that India treats Muslims. It is likewise possible that the attackers a Muslims, but are actually attempting to change some policy in Mumbai. Finally, it is possible that the attackers are actually Pakistanis, supported by Pakistan who are attempting to drive India from Jammu and Kashmir.

In each of the three cases, the motivations of the attackers matter a great deal in how India and the world deal with the attacks. India has weathered a great number of attacks over the years by Muslims motivated by the perceived occupation of Jammu and Kashmir, and India has decided that the value of holding onto their territory exceeds the cost that the terrorists are incurring in India. Other goals by the terrorists might elicit a different response by India.

It seems to us likely, that absent any further information on the Mumbai bombings, India will be forced to guess as to the motivations of the bombers. If that is the case, if there were political motives, those motives will likely go unfulfilled. Nevertheless, India, Pakistan and the United States should all tread carefully in this interim time, until motives become clear. Otherwise, policy makers in those countries risk drawing the wrong conclusions about the nature of yesterdays attacks, and at best instituting costly  useless policies, and at worst making the situation worse.

Currently, the United States Congress is debating raising the debt ceiling. Republicans claim they will not allow the ceiling to be raised unless there are significant cuts in spending. Defense spending, as a significant expense within the budget, is a potential target for cuts. However, defense spending is best allocated with a view to the strategy which will be used defend the country.

While it may be tempting to merely cut spending across the board, doing so with regards to defense spending could actually increase waste and decrease security. The military has a specific mission, defend the country, and several tasks within that mission, that it must use spending to accomplish. Having tools one does not need leads to waste; lacking tools one needs is a peril. Ideally, the military has all of the tools that it requires, and none of the ones that it does not.

The government, led by the president, determines the national interests that the military must defend. The government should then determine which strategy will best allow the military to defend the interests of the United States. While the means of the United States are great, they are not limitless, so leaders should consider the costs, benefits, and risks involved with each strategy. Once a strategy is set, Congress can budget accordingly, decreasing spending in areas no longer deemed worth the cost. However, without a clearly defined strategy, planners have no way of knowing what tasks for which they should allocate funds.

We should take as an example the case of Afghanistan, which Pres. Obama currently defines as being of vital national interest. Vital interests are interests that, if compromised, will significantly decrease the security of a state, much like suffering a vital wound threatens the life of an individual. As such, one would expect that allocations for the military that allow it to defend Afghanistan would take a second seat only to the homeland. Therefore, air and sea-lift capabilities, hardened targets within Afghanistan, Dari linguists, and so forth would be high priorities, whereas border security, litoral operations, Spanish linguists and so on would be of lower priority. If the military budget is cut, and the strategy is still to treat Afghanistan as a vital interest, then other interests will be pushed aside. If, however, other interests are actually vital, and the government has not changed strategy, the military could find itself ill equipped to deal with other challenges. Tools and capabilities necessary to fight in Afghanistan are costly burdens if the real interests, or missions, lie elsewhere.

This situation is not without historical analog. In the interwar years, the United Kingdom decided to declare a ten year long spending holiday on defense. However, the British government of the time did not readjust their positions in the world, or change their overall strategies. In short, when Germany began to rise, the UK found itself unprepared to fight wars in areas it was committed to defend like Belgium, and without strong alliances and sure defense plans because when it cut its defense budget it continued to attempt to control large areas of Africa, India, and Ireland which were not central to British security. It would be a great stretch to argue that the British budget created Hitler, but a better plan when budgeting, with stronger consideration on the issues that truly mattered to the UK, like stability on the Continent, instead of continued focus on colonies, might have left the UK in a better position when faced with true security challenges.

None of this is to say that military budgets cannot be cut. As the sole superpower in the world, the U.S. has a great deal of latitude when it comes to security. Surrounded on two sides by oceans, protected by a strong navy and nuclear weapons, the U.S. can probably change its strategy to one that requires a less active military without decreasing overall security.

Furthermore, a large budget can also decrease security by encouraging militaries to focus on seemingly superior, capital intensive technologies when cheaper technologies would be better. No number of Joint-Strike Fighters would have made the U.S. more secure on September 11^th, but a few more relatively cheap intelligence analysts, or airport security, or FBI agents might have helped a great deal.

Nevertheless, currently the United States seems to be pursuing a grand strategy that is part primacy (Iraq, Afghanistan GWOT etc.), and part collective security (Libya, NATO). Both of these strategies separately are expensive, and combining the two only magnifies the expense. Without altering strategy, and changing our declared interests, cutting budgets is very risky. The U.S. could end up in the security analog of having plenty of screwdrivers, but needing to drive nails.